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Calculating DAF Payout and What We Learn When We Do It Correctly
James Andreoni and Ray Madoff




The tremendous increase in the use of donor-advised funds for charitable donations has led 
policy-makers to ask if there is sufficient regulation and oversight of DAFs. In the absence of 
account level reporting, the debate has focused on the average payout rates of DAF sponsoring 
organizations, which have been reported by the DAF industry to exceed 20%. We show that the 
industry-preferred method for calculating payout rate overstates the correct payout by more than 
50%. We then argue that the flow rate is uninformative unless grounded in the stock of assets 
held by the DAF sponsor. We suggest a different measure of flow we call the stockpiling rate. 
Finally, we show that transfers between DAFSs cause DAF grants to be overstated. Reporting 
transfers separately would allow a more precise estimate of flow.
James Andreoni
Department of Economics
University of California, San Diego
9500 Gilman Drive












1. Introduction  
 
Donor-advised funds (DAFs) have enjoyed explosive growth in recent years, causing legislators 
and policy analysts to become increasingly interested in whether DAFs should be subject to 
more regulation and/or disclosure requirements.1 DAFs are a form of charitable giving in which 
donors transfer their cash or property  to a DAF sponsor, giving up legal ownership but 
retaining “advisory privileges” which allow the donor (or other designated advisor) to make 
decisions about the investment and disbursement of DAF assets.  Donors get an upfront 
charitable deduction because the DAF sponsor is itself a 501(c)(3) organization and the donor 
technically gives up dominion and control over their donation. But, because of the advisory 
privileges, DAFs operate in practice like a combination of a charitable investment, savings, and 
checking account. The donor decides whether or where to invest DAF funds and when, if ever, 
to disburse them to charities.   
The growth of donor-advised funds is a product of the benefits that they provide donors, DAF 
sponsors and financial advisors. DAFs are advantageous for donors because they allow donors 
to obtain maximum tax benefits for their charitable contributions by: (1) facilitating 
contributions of appreciated property, allowing donors to more easily save both capital gains 
taxes and income taxes on their charitable donations; and (2) allowing donors to front-load (or 
“bunch”) their charitable deductions in earlier years, even if the ultimate contribution to 
charity does not occur until many years later. 2 In addition, DAFs afford donors anonymity that 
other forms of charitable giving may not  permit.  Donor-advised funds are advantageous to 
DAF sponsors because sponsors receive management fees for the management of DAF assets. 
These fees can provide financial benefits for the financial institutions associated with 
commercial DAF sponsors and can play a significant role in supporting the work of community 
foundations and other mission driven DAF sponsors. Finally, financial advisors are able to earn 
their own management fees for managing the investments of their clients’ DAF accounts. These 
financial benefits for DAF sponsors and financial managers have resulted in significant 
marketing efforts designed to attract more contributions to DAFs. 
The extraordinary growth of DAFs in recent years is particularly striking in comparison to the 
growth of outright donations to charities (even accounting for contributions from DAFs). 
Looking at years 2016-2017, the most recent years for which full data is available, we see 
contributions to DAFs grew 23.4%, while outright contributions to charities (including 
contributions from DAFs) grew only 6.6%. While some of growth of DAFs that year might have 
 
1 In recent years there have been several proposals to regulate DAFs on both the state and federal levels. 
California is currently considering legislation which would require greater disclosure by DAF sponsors. In 
2013 Congressman Camp proposed a requirement that all DAF funds be subject to a five-year payout 
requirement. More recently, a group of philanthropic donors and leaders have urged Congress to adopt 
rules that would require individual DAF accounts (a well as private foundations) to distribute at least 10% 
of their assets each year for the next 3 years.  See http://charitystimulus.org/ . 
2 For a full discussion of these and other tax advantages for DAFs, see Andreoni, (2018):  and Colinvaux 
and Madoff, (2019)  
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been attributable to the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 on December 22, 
2017, we see similar discrepancies in prior years. From 2015 to 2016 contributions to DAFs 
grew 18.3%, whereas outright contributions to charities (including contributions from DAFs), 
only grew 3.3%. 
 While the benefits to donors and DAF sponsors are clear, the benefit of DAFs to the public is 
less certain as there are currently no regulations or time limits on when or how fast DAF funds 
must be disbursed to charities. In addition, there is only minimal information available to the 
public and regulators about the practices of DAF holders because there are no account level 
reporting requirements; the only reporting that is required is aggregate reporting by DAF 
sponsors. This has raised questions about the extent to which DAFs may be serving as resting 
places for charitable dollars.  
In response to these concerns, DAF sponsors have argued that there is no need for regulation 
because average DAF payout rates regularly exceed 20%. More recently, the concept of “flow 
rate” has been used to argue that DAFs efficiently deliver their funds to charities because  the 
amount of distributions in a given year is close to the amount of contributions, producing a 
flow rate of close to 100%.  
This short paper examines the following arguments around DAF payout:3  
First, and most importantly, this paper addresses the claim that DAF sponsors regularly payout 
in excess of 20%. Over the years, the DAF industry has used a variety of different formulae to 
calculate payout. We examine the effect of these different methods and show how these 
methods, including the one that generated the 20% figure, significantly overstate payout. We 
then show that there is only one formula that accurately answers that question: “what portion 
of DAF dollars that could go to charity are in fact going to charity?”4  
Second, we apply this formula to the 2017 tax returns for all DAF sponsoring organizations, the 
most recent year for which a complete set of returns are available. We show that the formula 
used by DAF sponsors increased payout rates by 53% for all DAF sponsors (and by 56% for 
commercial DAF sponsors) over the payout rate that would have been derived using the proper 
 
3 One issue that we are not discussing in this paper, but have discussed elsewhere, is the limited utility of 
using information about overall payout from sponsoring organizations for purposes of determining 
policy. Here we agree with the following statement from the report from the Congressional Research 
Service: “Because DAF accounts have heterogeneous objectives, in some cases to manage giving with 
high payout rates and in others to establish an asset base, a DAF sponsor can have a high average payout 
rate although many accounts have little or no payout…. This suggests that a minimum payout rate for 
sponsors would not be effective.” See “An Analysis of Charitable Giving and Donor Advised Funds” 
Congressional Research Service (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42595.pdf). 
 
 
4 We believe it is no coincidence that this is the same method that has been used by both the US 
Treasury and the Congressional Research Service in their evaluations of the effectiveness of DAFs. See 
the discussion in Section 2 and footnote 6 below. 
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method for calculating payout. We also show the heterogeneity of DAF payout rates amongst 
DAF sponsors. This data provides some interesting insights about DAF payout rates.  First, 
despite the frequent arguments that DAFs have payout rates far in excess of 5% (the minimum 
payout requirement imposed on private foundations), the data shows that in 2017  nearly one 
in four (24%) of  all DAF sponsors distributed less than 5% of their assets. Second, despite 
claims by community foundations that they have higher payout rates than commercial DAF 
sponsors, the data shows that community foundations had the highest percentage of DAF 
sponsors distributing less than 5% of their assets (28%) and that  commercial DAFs had the 
lowest number of DAF sponsors distributing less than 5% of their assets (4%).  
 Third, we explore the relatively new concept of flow rate. The flow rate places all of its focus 
on comparing the annual flow of dollars into and out of DAFs.  If the flow rate is high (close to 
1), it is argued, the DAF is acting as a simple ``pass-through’’ agent connecting donors to 
charities.  We argue here, however, that the flow rate, on its own, is a largely uninformative 
measure of DAF performance as it fails to distinguish between DAFs that warehouse donations 
from those that efficiently pass money from donors to charities.  However, we show how using 
flow rate, along with asset values can help provide information about how fast the pile of 
future charitable donations are stacking up or being drawn down (we call this the stockpiling 
rate). 
Finally, we explore how the existing measurements of DAF payout and flow rates overstate 
their benefits to charity because of the failure to account for DAF-to-DAF transfers. We 
examined DAF-to-DAF transfers from Fidelity Charitable to just 24 of the more than 1,100 DAF 
sponsors. These transfers, which represent no charitable donations whatsoever but are 
“booked” as grants to charities, allowed Fidelity Charitable to overstate grants by 3.8%. Even 
this calculation likely significantly understates the prevalence of DAF to DAF transfers because 
it is limited to transfers from Fidelity to commercial DAFs and does not include transfers 
between commercial DAFs and DAFs sponsored by community foundations and mission driven 
organizations.  Were such transfers between DAF sponsors separated from ordinary 
contributions and grants and reported, we could not only more accurately measure DAF payout 
rates, but also avoid double counting of charitable grants, thus getting a more precise measure 
of the impact of DAFs.  
 
2. Calculating DAF Payout Rates 
 
2.1 Available Information from Which to Calculate Payout   
The tax returns filed by DAF sponsors give four numbers from which to learn about the overall 
performance of DAFs (see IRS 990 form, Part I, Schedule D): 
Beginning of Year Assets (BOY): Assets on hand at the DAF sponsors on the first day of the 
fiscal year of the DAF Sponsor.  
Contributions (CONTRIBS): Money or non-cash Assets (e.g. stocks) given to DAF accounts over 
the course of the year. 
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Grants (GRANTS): Money withdrawn from DAFs and directed to other 501(c)(3) charities 
(including both outright distributions and distributions to DAFs) over the course of the year. 
End of Year Assets (EOY): Assets on hand at the end of the fiscal year. 
A fifth number not provided but nonetheless important is Investment returns: 
Investment Returns (RETURNS): Investment income or losses that have accumulated while the 
assets are invested while in DAFs. 
These five numbers are key because they give us an accounting identity, that is, an equation 
that tells us how we define different classifications of funds in relation to each other.  This 
identity is 
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 +  𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 –  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +  𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
 
The is called an identity because it must always hold.   It will be convenient at times to use 
𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 = 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, and write the accounting identity this way  
 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 =  𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 +  𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 –  𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶   
 
2.2. Industry reported Payout Rates and How They are Constructed.  
Over the years, the DAF industry has generally used one of two methods for measuring payout 





This equation was used widely until the National Philanthropic Trust (NPT), also a sponsor of 





With the rapid growth in the DAF balances each year, 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 is virtually always less than 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,   
meaning the second measure is likely to produce higher payout rates  than the first since the 
smaller the divisor, the larger the payout rate.5 
 
5 NPT says that it chose its payout methodology in order to match the methodology used by 
Candid/Foundation Center to evaluate payout rates from private foundations which, in turn, is based on 
payout rate calculations as laid out  in the Tax Code. The problem with using this methodology is that it 
does not answer the evaluative question that it purports to answer: “how effective has this entity been 
in distributing its available funds for charitable use” The purpose of the private foundation payout 
provisions in the Tax Code is not evaluative, but prescriptive. Its purpose is to establish prospective 
payout obligations for organizations that are often formed to exist in perpetuity.  As a determination of a 
prospective obligation, it makes sense that it is based on prior end of year values and does not include 
grants paid in its denominator (because we can’t know what those grants are.) In addition, private 
foundations are more typically funded up-front rather than receiving additional funds each year (as 
opposed to DAFs, where DAF sponsors are commonly the largest recipients of charitable donations, far 
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Unfortunately, whether intended or not, these formulae greatly overstate payout rates 
because both methods fail to include “grants made” as part of the denominator. Shrinking the 
divisor this way has the overall effect of increasing the payout rate and producing absurd 
results. For instance, imagine a DAF sponsor with just 2 customers.  Customer Anne has 
$10,000 in her DAF, makes no contributions, no grants, but earns $1000 in investment returns 
over the year.  She ends the year with $11,000 in her DAF.   Customer Anne’s payout rate is 
obviously zero.  Customer Bob, by contrast, opens a new DAF one day during the fiscal year, 
contributes $100,000 to the fund and immediately designates a $100,000 grant, leaving 
balance of $0 in his DAF.   Customer Bob’s payout rate is, obviously, 1 or 100%.  Yet, when this 
DAF sponsor fills out its 990 tax returns it will report grants are $100,000, BOY is $10,000 and 
EOY is $11,000.  Then using 𝑃𝑃1 and 𝑃𝑃2  will result in a payout rate of 9 and 10, respectively, that 
is, 900% and 1000%.   But how can a fund give out 9 or 10 times the assets available? How did 
our definitions of the payout rate lead us to such illogical conclusions? 
Let us ask, what we are hoping to learn from a payout rate?  To most people, we expect the 
term suggests that it reveals the amount of money granted out in a year as a fraction of the 
money available for the DAF sponsor to give away in that same year (and indeed, If we are 
measuring the efficiency of the DAF vehicle in converting donations to grants, that is the only  
ratio that makes sense.) Following our example above, the total dollars that could have been 
paid out are BOY assets ($10,000), plus contributions ($100,000), plus asset returns ($1000), or 
$111,000.  What was actually paid out was $100,000.  What fraction of available funds was 
paid to charities? The answer is 𝑃𝑃∗: 
𝑃𝑃∗ =
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
=
100,000





or 90%.  Notice, we do not always observe RETURNS in our data.  To get around this, we can 
note from the accounting identity that BOY+CONTRIBS+RETURNS = EOY + GRANTS.  This means 








Does this expression have the qualities we want?  When no assets are given to charity, 
𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 0, the payout rate will be 0.  When GRANTS are so large that they drive EOY to 
zero, then the payout rate is 1 or 100%.  If GRANTS only large enough to drive EOY to half of 
what it would have been if there were no grants, then then GRANTS equals EOY, and so 𝑃𝑃∗ will 
equal 0.5, which correctly states that half of all money available was granted to charity.   






out-performing other charities.)  Finally, the comparison between DAFs and private foundations is 
inapposite because the tax benefits afforded private foundations are significantly less generous than 
those afforded DAFs. Since DAFs are treated the same as outright gifts to charity, we believe that a more 
appropriate comparison would be to the 100% payout benefits of outright gifts to public charities.  
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as the true measure of DAF payout rates.  
We note that we are not the first to discover this formula for the payout rate. This same 
definition has appeared in reports by the US Treasury in 2011 and 2015, and by the 
Congressional Research Service in 2012.6  
 
3. Comparing Formulae for Calculating Payout Rates 
 
Figure 1 compares the three measures, 𝑃𝑃1, 𝑃𝑃2, and our preferred 𝑃𝑃∗, for all DAF sponsors from 
2014 to 2017.   As suggested above, 𝑃𝑃2 > 𝑃𝑃1 > 𝑃𝑃∗. This shows that using BOY asset as the 
denominator provides a payout rate that most overstates the true payout rate. 
 
 
Table 1, panel B, reports payout rates for 2017 calculated by these three methods, separated 
by the type of DAF sponsor.   As expected, this shows that both  𝑃𝑃1 and 𝑃𝑃2 significantly 
overstate the payout rate relative to the true payout rate 𝑃𝑃∗, and that the current industry 
favorite, 𝑃𝑃2, overstates payout rates the most.   
 
 
6  See Gravelle and Sherlock (2012) and Arnsberger (2015), and the 2011 “Report to Congress on 
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Table 1. DAFs Payout rates and non-compliance with industry 








Panel A: Aggregate statistics on DAFs 2017 
Number of Sponsors 47 628 439 1114 
Number of DAFs 213,639 78,701 56,182 348,522 
BOY 2017 $Million 46,101 30,468 9,801 86,370 
     EOY 2017 $Million   61,095 40,278 11,380 112,753 
Grants 2017 $Million 10,814 6,005 2,565 19,384 
Average DAF Account 
Balance, at EOY 2017, dollars 285,974 511,779 224,478 323,518 
Panel B: Payout rates calculated three ways† 
Preferred Payout Rate, P*  15.04% 12.97% 18.39% 14.67% 
2nd Industry Payout Rate P2  23.46% 19.71% 26.17% 22.44% 
1st Industry Payout rate P1 17.70% 14.91% 22.54% 17.19% 
Overstatement using P2 vs P* 56.0% 51.9% 42.3% 53.0% 
Panel C: Non-compliance with industry standards by DAF 
sponsors 
Pct with payout rates < 5% 4% 28% 22% 24% 
Pct with payout rates < 20% 62% 89% 53% 77% 
†  P*= Grants/ (EOY+Grants),  P2 =Grants/BOY,  P1+D9:H23 =Grants/EOY 
In 2017 the DAF payout rate was reported by the industry formula to be 22.44%, while the true 
method calculates payout at only 14.67%.    As we report in the final column of the table, 𝑃𝑃2 for 
all DAF sponsors combined exceeded 𝑃𝑃∗ by 53%.    Looking across types of DAF sponsors, 
Commercial sponsors, who managed over $61 billion in DAF funds in 2017, overstated payout 











































b. Payout Below 20%
Figure 2: Percent of DAFs Failing to Meet Payout Thresholds. 
9 
Figure 2 explores the degree to which using 𝑃𝑃∗ rather than   𝑃𝑃2 affects how we see the 
performance of DAFs relative to two common benchmarks.  The lowest benchmark is reaching 
a minimal 5% payout, and second is a more robust 20% payout.  Panel a of the figure shows 
that 28% of community foundations failed to reach even minimal payout rates of 5%, while 
89% failed to reach the 20% payout threshold. Commercial DAFs were much more likely to 
satisfy the 5% rule than were community foundations, but like the community foundations, 
high fractions of commercial DAFs, 62%, also failed to reach target payout of 20%.  When 
compared to the same calculations using 𝑃𝑃2, the evaluation of DAFs is substantially less 
favorable. 
4. What About the Flow Rate?
H. Daniel Heist and Daniella Vance-McMullen (2019) recently suggested a new measure of the
performance of DAFs, which they call the flow rate.  The name originates in the fact that this
measure is a function of only flows (contributions, grants), not stocks (assets on deposit in
DAFs).    High flow rates have been used to argue against regulation of DAFs. Consider the
following quote from the Alliance for Charitable Reform (a group opposed to DAF regulation):
“Median flow rates of 87% suggest that donor-advised funds act as pass-through philanthropic
intermediaries, not as long-term parking lots for charitable dollars.”7 However, flow rate, by its
terms, ignores the most relevant factor for those concerned about assets being parked in DAFs:
namely, the amount of assets that are parked in DAFs.
Heist and Vance-McMullen define the flow rate as the ratio of grants to contributions.  
Unfortunately, this index is uninformative for most policy purposes.  First, it is ill-defined since 
true flow rate would be more accurately defined by using the ratio of grants to revenues 
(contributions plus investment returns). According to the data summarized in Table 1, this 
correction to the flow rate would reduce the average rate from 63% to 55%.    
Second, and more fundamentally, flow rate fails to differentiate among DAF sponsors on the 
most policy-relevant questions.  Imagine three DAF sponsors.  Sponsor A has end-of-year assets 
of $100,000 and annual contributions and grants both equal to $1,000. Sponsor B has end-of-
year assets of $1,000, and annual contributions and grants both equal to $100,000.  Sponsor C 
has end-of-year balances of 100,000 and contributions and grants of $600,000. Cleary sponsor 
A should be of far greater concern to society than sponsor B, while C might be seen as a model 
of successful DAF management, with a two-month supply of gifts “in inventory.”  Nonetheless, 
all can report flow rates of 1. 
7 Marques Chavez,  “Data Contradict Common Myths of Donor-Advised Funds,” Alliance for Charitable 




4.1. A more informative measure of flow. 
If we want an index of how effectively DAFs are managing their flow of funds, can we design a 
new measure that gives the flow more meaning by reporting flow relative to the assets held by 
the DAF?  We propose a new measure that looks at the net flow, 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 − 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, as a 





Note, there are important similarities between stockpiling and flow rates.  A value of 𝐶𝐶 ≥ 0 
indicates the stockpile of donations is rising and 𝐶𝐶 < 0 means donors are spending down the 
stockpile.  The rate at which the stockpile is changing will be expressed in terms of BOY assets.  
To continue the analogy to DAF assets as an inventory of charitable assets awaiting donation, 
the numerator is the change in inventory of donations to charity and the denominator is the 
base level of that inventory.   What is most desirable is a numerator close to 0 (that is, a 
flowrate close to 1) combined with a denominator that is small to minimize the carrying cost of 
that inventory.   
In the most recent data, for 2017, 𝐶𝐶 = 0.32, meaning stockpiles rose in value by 32% over the 
prior year.  When the stockpile rises, it is unavoidable -that the social cost of holding this 
stockpile of donations must rise as well. 
 
5. Complications from DAF-to-DAF transfers 
 
All calculations of payout rates and flow rates overstate charitable benefit because they are 
contaminated by unknown amounts of DAF-to-DAF transfers.    A customer of Fidelity 
Charitable can move DAF funds to Vanguard Charitable (or to a DAF at a community 
foundation), the same way funds would be moved from a DAF to a traditional charity, like the 
American Red Cross.  Logging in to their DAF account at Fidelity Charitable, the donor simply 
selects Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program as the designated charity rather than the 
American Red Cross.  When a donor does this, however, Fidelity  Charitable’s  ledger will reflect 
this transfer as a grant to charity, the same as it would if the donor had designated the 
American Red Cross as recipient, even though the money is simply going to a donor’s DAF 
account with a different DAF sponsor.  Furthermore, this grant will enter Vanguard Charitable’s 
books as a new contribution.  Both accounting entries will affect the impression that, in this 
example, Fidelity Charitable is increasing payout while Vanguard Charitable is attracting 
contributions, while in truth no charity and no donor has been financially affected.   When the 
donor finally grants the money to the American Red Cross, it will be counted twice, once as a 
grant from Fidelity and second as a grant from Vanguard. 
To illustrate the problem let’s again imagine two fictional DAF sponsors, each with one 
customer.  Both customers have DAFs worth $100,000 at the beginning of the year.  Mid-year, 
the two decide to switch DAF sponsors.  So, each customer grants $100,000 to the other 
sponsor and each ends the year with no grants to charities and $100,000 in DAF assets.   In 
11 
terms of charitable benefit, both sponsors should be reporting a zero-payout rate. However, 
since the law has no mechanism to reflect that the grant was simply a DAF-to-DAF transfer,  
using both 𝑃𝑃1 and 𝑃𝑃2 results in a payout rate of 100%, while 𝑃𝑃∗ also errs by stating  a payout 
rate of 50%.    
Importantly, this is not a problem of the payout rate formula, but an issue of proper 
accounting. Honest treatment of DAF-to-DAF transfers would require a transfer to another DAF 
to be reported in a separate category, not as part of grants or contributions, and folded into 
the EOY total along with market returns.  That is, we would employ a new accounting identity: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 + (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂)
− 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶  
= 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 + 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶 + (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 +𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶) − 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶     
where CONTRIBS and GRANTS no longer include any transfers. 
5.1. How much can DAF-to-DAF transfers matter? 
To illustrate the potential importance of this problem in the actual data, we looked at a sample 
of 46 commercial DAF sponsors in 2017 and found 24 (51%) had received transfers of DAF 
funds from Fidelity Charitable.8  Surprisingly, these 24 transfers alone artificially inflated 
Fidelity’s grants by 3.03% and erroneously raised their payout rate from 14.75% to 15.17%.   
We did not inspect the roughly 1100 remaining DAF sponsors, nor did we do a dive into 
transfers between DAFs for all sponsors, as this would require well over a million operations.  
But the size of the effect from just 24 DAF-to-DAF transfers seems to be convincing evidence 
that learning more about these transfers could alter our picture of payout rates in 
consequential ways.9   
6. Conclusion
Payout rates have been at the center of discussion on evaluation of DAFs. What we hope to 
establish in this note is that, in order to provide meaningful information about the efficacy of 
DAFs, payout rates must be calculated with reference to all of the funds in the DAF available for 
payout. In addition, by its very name, a payout rate should be a number between 0 (no payout) 
8 This calculation likely significantly understates the prevalence of DAF to DAF transfers because it does 
not include transfers between commercial DAFs and DAFs sponsored by community foundations or 
mission driven organizations.  Reportedly many wealthy donors have multiple DAF accounts using 
different DAF sponsors. For example, it is not uncommon for a donor to have both a commercial DAF (for 
low fees) and a community foundation DAF (in order to support the local community) and to transfer 
assets between their two DAFs.  
9 Notice that we only need to adjust for transfers once, and that is to remove transfers-out from 
GRANTS.  To adjust the payout formula for transfers-in as well would be to double-count transfers.  
However, if one is reporting on contributions, one must be careful to remove transfers-in from 
CONTRIBS while leaving the transfers-in as part of the EOY total assets. 
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and 1 (100% payout) and paying out 𝑥𝑥%  of the maximum available money should give a 
payout rate of 𝑥𝑥/100.  The two measures of payout rates advocated by the DAF industry both 
fail to satisfy this logical  interpretation of the term and, in fact, can produce preposterous 
payout rates, such as the suggestions DAFs pay out 9 or 10 times what they have on hand to 
give.   
To address these concerns, we derived a formula for the payout rate constrained to satisfy the 




Using 𝑃𝑃∗ rather than either formula of payout devised by the DAF industry, 𝑃𝑃2 or 𝑃𝑃1,  we find 
that overall average payout rates for 2017  fall from over 22% to under 15%.  In addition, the 
number of DAFs meeting key thresholds of payout rates changes, often quite dramatically.  The 
difference between 𝑃𝑃∗ and 𝑃𝑃2 can be seen most starkly when looking at the fraction of DAF 
sponsors who fail to reach a payout rate of 20%.  Using the industry-defined 𝑃𝑃2 we see fewer 
than a third (28%) fail to reach this payout target.  However, using 𝑃𝑃∗we discover that the true 
number is actually 62% paying out less than 20%, or more than double that following from the 
industry-designed formula.  The pattern repeats when examining community foundations.   𝑃𝑃∗ 
adds eight percentage points to the probability of failing to payout 5% (28% vs 20%) and adds 
14 percentage points to the probably of a payout below 20% (89% vs 75%). 
Next, we explored new measure, the flow rate, and found that without grounding it a stock-
variable like beginning-of-year assets, the flow rate carries far too little information to  be used 
reliably as an index of DAF efficiency.  A measure like the stockpiling rate, 𝐶𝐶 =
(𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶 − 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) 𝐵𝐵𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸,⁄  uses the elements of the flow rate in the numerator, but by 
grounding it in beginning-of-year assets tells us how fast the pile of future charitable donations 
is stacking up (𝐶𝐶 > 0) or is being drawn down (𝐶𝐶 < 0), a more useful measure of flow.   
The stockpiling rate also puts attention back on a variable at the center of discussion about 
DAFs.  In the latest year of data available, 2017, 𝐶𝐶 = 0.32 or a 32% increase in the stockpile of 
gifts.     As with any other stockpile, the bigger the stockpile the greater the carrying costs of 
the stockpile.  In this case the costs are mainly felt by taxpayers, since these people have, 
collectively,  pre-paid the charitable deduction and are waiting for 𝐶𝐶 < 0 so the contribution to 
charity to be taken from the stockpile and made into a charitable contribution.   
Finally, we have shown that all measures of the performance of DAF will be more accurate, and 
so inform better policy, if we can account for the effects of DAF-to-DAF transfers. 
In sum, how we measure and report on the performance of DAFs can make a tremendous 
difference to how policy makers may evaluate the impacts of DAFs.  In particular, the argument 
that DAFs are always preferable to private foundations is belied by the fact that close to 1 in 4 
DAF sponsors (24%) distributed less than 5% of their assets in 2017.   
Agreeing on the facts—and their interpretations—is essential for meaningful policy discussions.  
When it comes to DAFs,  𝑃𝑃∗ is the most accurate measure of payout rate for both marketing 
and policy discussion purposes.  The flow rate provides too little information to be a reliable 
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indicator of DAF performance. Finally, reporting DAF-to-DAF transfers separately from either 
contributions or grants on 990 filings with the IRS will allow those evaluating DAFs to measure 
payout without bias.  
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